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FOR�'•TORD 
Dr. Charles Wolf, Jr., was Visiting Professor of Economics and 
Southeast Asian Studies at Cornell University during 1953-54. Prior to 
this, Dr. Wolf was with the State Department and the Far Eastern Program 
Division of ECA-MSA-FOA. During the early part of 1953 while on a tour 
of inspection for the Foreign Operations Administration, Dr. Wolf observed 
the small scale economic development projects which he analyzes in his 
paper. The projects which he describes are not only of interest in 
themselves, but also contribute to our knowledge of the extent to which 
profitable opportunities can generally be expected to exist for the use 
of marginal increments of investment in underdeveloped areas. 
Preliminary data concerning productivity, costs and returns suggest:. 
that the projects described are examples of successful economic development 
and that small-scale investment can succeed dramatically in underdeveloped 
countries: The first project described, land reclamation in Burma, is an 
example of successful social investment made by an outside agency (U.S., 
M.S.A.), an i.nvestment organized and executed with a minimum amount of . 
local initiative and requiring no chang� in local production techniques, 
marketing, or credit arrangements. The third project, establishment of 
small-scale powered fishing boat building in Java, contrasts sharply with 
the Burmese land reclamation project. Here, a relatively small government 
investment produced a revolutionary and highly productive change in local 
fishing technology. This project is representative of the opportunities 
which may exist to utilize native skiDrs more productively through liberal 
credit arrangements. 
The second project, a small-scale ceramics development program in 
West Java is of interest because of the integration of (a) investment in 
research and training to develop skills, designs and standards for 
successful ceramics production, (b) investment in purchasing and marketing 
cooperatives to support the small-scale local producers and (c) investment 
in credit facilities to enable the local producers to acquire relatively 
costly but productive equipment. l-Jith development of the embryonic cooperative 
organization the heavy application of government initiative required to bring 
the project into being will dwindle away. 
Dr. Wolf conclud�s that the specific projects described, while not 
warranting general conclusions, suggest that the limited extent of the 
internal raarket in unde�jeveloped countries rnay be offset by (a) production
of substitutes for im1:o.r--::.s, (b) production of products for which consumer 
preferences are strong, or (c) production for a strong export market. The 
projects also suggest that larger, capital/intensive social investment may 
not be necessary to achieve economically successful small-scale development. 
Frank H. Golay 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
and Far Eastern Studies 
Department of Far Eastern Studies 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, New York 
/11,1.gust, 1954 
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I - I�"TRor,ucTION 
One of the many unresolved questions in the field of economic develop­
ment is whether or not, and to what extent, profitable opportunities can 
generally be expected to exist for the use of marginal increments of invest­
ment in underdeveloped areas (1). Considered in abstract, analytical terms, 
the affirmative side of this question is generally based on either or both 
of two lines of argument: 
(1) The relative marginal physical productivity of any factor of 
production tends to vary with the scarcity of that factor relative to other 
factors. On the basis of the principle of diminishing returns, it is thus 
suggested that capital -- which is scarce in underdeveloped countriest-� 
should have a relatively high marginal physical productivity and profitable 
investment opportunities should normally tend to be abundant .• 
(2) In general, economically underdeveloped areas are· technologically
retarded in the obvious sense that the methods of production which they
employ are less productive than those that are available elsewhere. 
Incremental doses of capital are likely to have an unusually large effect 
on output since such increments represent not only an increase in the stock 
of scarce capital, with a high marginal productivity, but also a means of 
changing existing production functions, i.e. introducing new methods of 
production which increase the productivity of existing resources as well (2). 
The resulting impact o.n total output is likely to increase the return to 
capital substantially. 
The negative side of the question is usually stated in the following 
terms: 
(1) The opportunity to invest is limited by the narrow size of the market 
in underdeveloped countries (3). This reformulation of Adam Smith's tradition­
al proposition assumes: first, that units of investment are, technologically, 
not divisible beyond a certain point; and second, that increased investment 
therefore generally implies producing on a significantly larger scale. �There 
there is only a limited market to absorb the increased output, the investment 
itself is discourag�d� Underdeveloped countries are thus prevented from 
realizi11g the increasit�g pl1ysical returns that large scale investment frequentljr
entails, This situati.or. mc:y normally be expected to restrict sharply the 
availability of pr-ofitatl-3 investment opportunities; 
1!1. The ter:n "µrof'i.tE:<.°!.JJ_e as here used, means that the disc;clUited ,raJ.ue of 
anticipated returns 
,
s1.itistantially excee0s. the ccs"'t�s associa·Ged with a 
particular investment� How large the excess must be for a partieular
investment to be regarded as profitable varies ov·er time and depends on the 
opportunity cost of capital as reflected by prevailing interest and profit 
rates. 
2. See 1,Jolf, C. "Economic Development and Reform," Far Eastern Quarterly, 
November 1952, p. 33. 
3. l�urkse, Ragnar, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, 
New York, 1953, PP• 6-9. 
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(2) In developed countries, a wealth of capital facilities has been 
built up over the years in such fields as power, transportation, connnunications,
housing, education, etc., to "service" the needs of new industrial and 
agricultural investments. These facilities create economies "external" to 
an individual new firm or investment; from the standpoint of a prospective 
investor the provision of these services may therefore involve only small 
additional costs. By contrast, the lack of such social overhead in under­
developed countries frequently means that particular services entail large
fixed costs rather than small variable costs (4). The high initial costs of 
providing for "social" overhead may thus out1-1eigh the high marginal produc­
tivity of the directly productive "private" component of investment, and hence 
may limit investment opportunities from the standpoint of the individual 
entrepreneur. 
Rather than exploring these analytical alternatives in the abstract, the 
purpose of this paper is the more limited one of trying to shed some light on 
the problem by describing a few specific investment projects which the author 
had an opportunity to visit in Burma and Indonesia during the early part of 
1953. The specific proj.ects described in Part II are examples of apparently 
highly profitable, small-scale investments, Generalizations on the basis of 
these few cases would suggest an affirmative answer to the question whether 
profitable investment opportunities can be expected to exist in underdeveloped
countries under present cost and market conditions. In Part III, an attempt
is made to summarize some of the general implications of the projects 
discussed. 
On the other hand, the projects are a·dmi ttedly few and special, and 
perhaps offer little basis for generalization. Certainly, tl1ey afford no 
analytically satisfactory answer concerning the extent to which profitable 
investment opportunities can be expected in underdeveloped countries. It 
should also be noted that the data presented were gathered during brief visits 
which were made to the project sitea in January and February 1953. The data 
are thus neither current nor complete; however, they may at least suggest 
that more detailed cost-benefit studies of these and other projects would be 
rewarding. 
Recognizing these limitations the cases are offered partly for such 
bearing as they may have on the general problem of investment opportunities,
and also partly because they should be of interest in themselves to those 
concerned with development at the micro-economic level generally, and, more 
specifically, to those who are interested particularly in economic development 
in Burma and Indonesia. 
One final qualification to the project descriptions should be noted. In 
describing the projects, the writer does not pretend to technical competence
in the specific fields covered. The project descriptions should be read with 
4. The importance of a shortage of social overhead as a deterrent to new 
investment in underdeveloped areas has been emphasized especially by P.N. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, see, for example, the latter's "Problems of Industrial­
ization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," Economic Journal, June­
September, 1943� See also Nurl�se, op. cit., pp. 1�2-154. 
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this in mind. Nevertheless, the writer suggests that economists .and 
"planners" should try to get increasingly familiar with some of the technical, 
engineering and organizational aspects of development projects if their 
judgment and analysis are to be relevant and useful. It is hoped that the 
present paper. takes a step in this direction. 
II - THREE PROJECTS 
l, Burma - Small-scale Reclamation. 
Some of the most fertile rice land in the world is located in the 
Irrawaddy delta region of Lower Burma, the "rice-basket" of Burma. Yields 
in this area are somewhat above yields in other rice areas of Southeast Asia, 
i.e, about two-thirds of a ton of milled rice per acre. 
Two major problems have prevented a substantial rise in output under 
existing cultivation techniques, quite apart from such possible changes in 
cultivation techniques as use of improved seed, increased application of 
fertilizer, row-planting of seeds and transplanting of seedliags. The first 
of these problems involves the shortness of the growing (wet) season, which 
prevents double cropping. The second arises from the restrictive effects of 
topography, in conjunction with rainfall, on land use. The nature of this 
problem, and the way it is being solved throughout the delta region, by small­
scale reclamation projects, can be illustrated by a specific example on 
Yandoon Island� 
The island of Yandoon is about 50 miles north of Rangoon along the 
Irrawaddy River. It is one of many saucer-shaped islands and peninsulas
dotting the Delta area. Typical of these islands, Yandoon is about 90,000 
acres or about 140 square miles in total area, Cultivation is confined to 
a relatively narrow strip around the circumference,. j,ust inside the levees 
wl1ich protect. the isl.a11d from the rise in the Irrawaddy's wator level during
the monsoon •. or the total area, only about one-third or perQaps 30,o000 
acres is actually farmed. 
The remainder of the island comprises the downward-sloping sides and 
low inner-basin of the saucer. _Th.is larger section of Yandoon is uncultivated 
throughout the year because o! inundation during the monsoon and an .  
accumulation of stagnant, brackish water duri.ng the dry season. The problem 
is one that was familiar in the rice areas of Louisiana in the United States,
and it is being overcome by similar measures, . 
The basic ·principle involved in reclaiming the idle two-thirds of 
Yandoon island is to bring Irrawaddy water- into the inner basin under 
controlled conditions at the beginning of the monsoon. At this time of the 
year, the Irrawaddy is heavily-silted,o. and the controlled inflow deposits
the rich si1t just inside the outer cultivated rim· of the island, thereby
building up the sloping sides and eventually the flat basin at the center 
of the island. 
At Yandoon this operation is being accomplished by the installation of 
a steel sluice gate, 18 feet -high, 40 feet wide and six inches thick, at one 
point close to the island's rim• .  Grounded in concrete,o. the gate is at theo· 
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head of a concrete channel 3200 feet in length, about 10 feet in depth and 
about 40 feet in width. The channel is dotted with groupings of concrete 
friction blocks to slow down the Irrawaddy waters when the gate is raised. 
A shallower dirt channel runs from the concrete runway farther into the 
center basin. 
\-J'hen the control gate is raised, the silted water rushes into the 
concrete runway, is slowed down by the friction blocks and then flows farther 
down the dirt channel. At the end of the channel, the water spreads out 
around the island, backwashing against the higher cultivated rim, and 
depositing the silt, to build up the sloping sides of the inner basin (5).
The sluicing operation is repeated several times during the early stage or 
the monsoon, and adds a total of about 750 acre-feet of silt to the inner 
basin each year. This siltage results in a reclamation of 300 acres annually
in the early years; the reclaimed acreage rising above this rate in the 
later years. 
The total investment required in the Yandoon project is 500,000 kyats (6) ,  
or slightly over �100,000, of which approximately one-third represents
foreign exchange costs (largely for the steel gate and concrete mixer), and 
the remainder represents local costs for labor and IMterials, Of the local 
costs, the labor used is provided by local farmers (7), who are otherwise 
idle during the dry season, i. e. their social or opportunity cost is zeroo 
Against these costs, the current (spring 1954) export price of rice 
is about $140 per ton f.o.ob. Rangoon. Assuming an average value at the farm 
of �100 to allow for milling and transportation costs, and assumi.ng an 
average yield of two-thirds ton of milled rice per acre on each of the 300 
acres returned to cultivation annually, total output would be raised by
$20,000 at the end of the first year's operation, $40,000 at the end of the 
second, t6o,OOO at the end of the third, etc, If it takes one year to 
complete the project, these increases in output would not be realized until 
the second, third and fourth years, respectively. (8) 
5. At the end or the island, diametrically opposite the sluice gate, a 
drainage canal was to be instaUed to permit the water to drain back into 
the Irrawaddy after the silt has been deposited. This had not been 
completed, though ground had been broken, at the time of my visit in 
February 1953. By installing lift pumps, this drainage operation can be 
further expanded to draj_n of£ the continued accumulation of brackish water 
until the surface of the inner basin has been built up. 
6. 4.75 kyatso: $1. 00 U.S. 
7. At an average wage of 2. 50 ks or about �.50 U.S. per day. 
8. Thus, if a �  annual increase in cultivated acreage,
y = the average yield per acre, 
p = average price of rice at the farm, and 
n = the number of years of operation, i.ncluding one year for 
completion of the project, 
Then the annual output O, attributable to the project in yearon, can be 
expressed as: 
0: ayp (n-1). (continued on next page) 
• • 
Clearly, as output rises, additional capital, as well as current, 
expenditures would be required to permit cultivation of the increased acreage
and movement of the increased output. Additional capital outlay would be 
needed, for example, to provide roads, bullocks, plows, storage, etc. 
Additional current costs would be incurred for seed and labor. If the 
additional capital costs equalled the total cost of the original reclamation 
project (i.e.· $100,000), and the additional current costs amounted to 20% 
of annual output, amortization of the initial project costs, as well as the 
additional capital outlays, would still be possible in six years. 
iWle these data are rough approximations, and in no sense constitute 
a full analysis of costs and benefits, they at least suggest the orders of 
magnit�de which are involved. 
2. Indonesia - Small Industry (9). 
I 
The arguments for development of small�scale industry in underdeveloped 
countries, generally, are too well-known to need elaborationo As a partial
answer to the problem of rural underemployment and m ..ba.n unemployment, and 
as an investment which does not require large capital on.tlays_ and is presumed 
to yield fairly rapid returns, small-scale ind�stry is accorded consider�ble 
attention in current discussions of economic development (10)� At the same 
time, serious questions are frequently raised concerning the problem of 
organizing and initiating small-scale industrial development, and of the 
ability of small industry to compete with larger�scale industr�r, either 
domestic or foreign. Agai.nst this background, a descriptio.n of Indonesia's 
experience with one pa�ticular aspect of small-scale industrial development 
is of particular interest. 
8. (Continued from page u) 
The total cumulative increase in output (£0) can then be expressed as the 
sum of an arithmetic progression whose first term is zero, or 
[: 0 = T [ ayp (n-l)j : n�:yp (n-1) 
In this case, the capital-output ratio in any year is a function of time, 
rather than being constant once the project is in full operation. Within 
the limits of the total area available, the capital-output coefficient v,
in yearon, 1s: 
I 
ayp (n .. l) 
where I is the original investment. 
• 
9. The description and discussion which follows is o.nly a partial microcosm 
of a large effort in this field. It is understood that the UN Technical 
Assistance Board will soo.n publish a detailed description and analysis of 
work in this field in Itidonesia. The writer has not seen this report to 
date, although he has profited from conversations about this project with 
two of its major organizers, Ivlessrs. Stepanek and Rao. However, neither 
has reviewed the facts here presented and any errors are the author's. 
10. See, for example, Aubrey, H. G., "Small Industry in Economic Development," 
Social Research, September 19$1. 
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The area of Plered near Bandung, in l•Test J8va, has long been a center 
of small scale pottery production. Plered was therefore selected in 1951 
as the site for initiating a eeramics development program by the Indonesian 
Government with assistance from the United Nations and the United States 
Economic Cooperation Administration. 
The ceramics program consists of three interrelated parts (11): (a) the 
Research and Training Institute in Bandung; (b) the processing, credit and 
marketing "centrale" (or Induk) in Plered; and (c) the privately owned and 
managed potters' shops in the Plered area. 
The Training and Research Institute develops new and marketable product
designs and standards, and trains local workers from the Plered area in 
using new techniques and equipment and in meeting the established designs
and standards (12). Housed in a rehabilitated pre-war municipal building in 
Bandung, the Institute's equipment represents an investment of �30,000 for 
sagger machi.nes, jigger arms, and slip-cast mo\llds. 
Situated in a former warehouse, reconstructed with voluntary local labor 
and materials provided by the ¥J.nistry of Economic Affairs in Jakarta, the 
ceramics Induk functions as a combined purchasing, credit, �nd marketing 
"cooperative.o" It purchases and processes clay and glaze for distribution 
to the surrounding potters' shops. For its processing operations, the Induk 
has a stock of equipment, imported with ECA aid, valued at approximately 
$50,o000. The equipment consists of ball mills for mixing clay and glaze,
clay mixers, water presses, and "pug" mills which refine and prepare the raw 
clay in the form of solid slabs or "pugs." The daily output of prepared 
clay is 10 tons. 
With a capital fund of 500,o000 (13) rupiahs provided by government
appropriation, the Induk also makes loans, for both working and fixed capital, 
to producing units. The typical loan, received by each of the four producing
shops visited by the writer, was 40, 000 rs (about �3,500) to be repaid over 
a six year period at an annual interest charge of 12% on the unpaid principal. 
The interest rate includes a premium designed to amortize the original
investment by the Central Government in building the installation, and to 
cover maintenance and operating costs of the imported equipment. 
11. Although the description which follows is confined to the ceramics 
industry, the general approach and pattern is also being applied in a 
-number of other fields including leather .. working, metal working, furniture 
making and wood-working. The detailed U.N. report on small industry work 
in Indonesia will, I Wlderstand, cover these other fields as well. 
12. In addition, the Ceramics Institute, and the Research and Training 
Institutes in other fields, service technical requests from private
industry and from the ten Industrial Inspectors 1 Offices in Java. These 
offices, with a small but growing tecl1nicBl staff, function as an 
individual extension service to assist local industries to solve 
production and marketing problems, and to give technical assistance to 
new industries. It would be highly useful to undertake a detailed study
of the scope and effectiveness of this potentially important institution. 
13. ll.40 rupiah: $1.00 U.S. 
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In large part, these loans are used to meet the fixed capital require-­
ments of the individual shops for high-heat kilns, and·obetter potter's
equipment (e.g. casting moulds,o. new kick wheels, jigger arms for cutting
and shaping, etc.). I·nitially, the loans are also used· to meet part of the 
wages of the potters working in the shop. 
Finally, the Induk functions as a marketing cooperative, securing large 
urban orders for eooking utensils,. tea. sets,o. vases, ash trays and other 
products of the Plered shops, and sub-contracting these orders among the 
shops {J.4)·• Delivery is then made to the Induk which distributes directly
to the wholesaler in Jakarta, . Surabaya,.Medan and other urban areas•. 
Administratively, the Induk is not, or at least not yet, a genuine 
cooperative. Its assets and physical plant are owned by the government •. Its 
advisory board consists of the individual shop owners in Plered,. although 
operating control is exercised by a Director appointed by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in Jakarta •. The expressed intention, however,.is for 
ownership and management to pass into the hands of the advisory board upon 
repayment of the ioans made from the Induk's original 500,000 rs. capital
fund •. 
In the individual producing shops, eight or ten potters work under the 
general supervision of the owner-manager of the shop. In the shops visited, 
from five to seven men worked on kick wheels, or hand wheels, and occasionally 
with cast moulds; one man (and in one shop, a woman) glazed the work by
passing it through_oa glazing solution; and one man was in charge of the kiln,
assembling the glazed work in sagger pots and then baking the work in the 
kiln. The working day was seven hours; the daily wage was six rupiahs,. 
representing -- according to several of the workers -- a 50% rise overo· the 
initial wage five or six months previously._ It·omight be noted that no. 
significant rise in the cost of living had occurred in this period. The 
writer was told that the increased wage was due to higher productivity and 
to competitive bidding for skilled workers among the individual shops•. 
Data were not obtained on productivity, profits, or return on capital.
However, it is understood that the output of the Plered shops is being 
delivered in Jakarta., at a cost, including a margin for an1ortization and • 
profits, 40% below the price of competing Japanese imports of comparable 
products• .  Since Indonesia's imports of pottery and related products, .Largely
from Japan, were in 1951 about 45 million rupiah (about $4,000,000) (15), 
there would appear to be no immediate obstacle to a substantial growth in 
domestic output and sales even within the limits of the prese.nt market. 
3. Indonesia - Fisheries Development •. 
. ' 
Fish is the main source of protein in the typical Indonesian diet. 
Annunl imports of fish and fish products in 1952 were about 140 000 tons by., 
14. At the time of my visit the Induk was planni.ng to open its own sales 
offices in Jakarta •.. 
15. Monthly Survey of Statistics, Ichtisar Bula!¥ln, Republic �f Indonesia., 
June 1952, P• 23 •_. ' 
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volume (16) with an estimated value of over 200,o000,o000 rupiah or about 
�tl7,000,o000. Fish occupies a high place in consumer preferences; it is 
perhaps one of the few products for which there is a large unfilled demand 
at the current market price and at current levels of money income. It is 
also probable that the demand for fish will significantly increase with any 
increase in income as well as with increases in population. 
Along with the currently strong and potentially growing demand, the 
Indonesian archipelago is one of the most richly endowed fishing areas in 
the world; the Pacific waters surrounding and dividing the archipelago are 
heavily laden with a wide variety of edible fish, large and small. 
To a great extent,. this rich resource remains untapped •. Due largely 
to the small size and slow speed of the fishing craft used, fishing in 
Indonesia has typically been confined to a limited area close to shore. This 
limitation has left the bulk of Indonesia's rich deep-sea fish resources, 
which lie perhaps forty miles and farther from shore, untapped; it also 
accounts for the low productivity and income of the small segment of the 
population engaged in fishing. 
In the past three years, a program to expand the fishing sector of the 
economy, by .building a motorized fishing fleet, has produced significant
results •. This program was started with assistance from the Economic Co­
operation Administration in 1951-1952. Initially, eighty motorized fishing
b.c)ats were purchased in Japan and brought to Indonesia to be used by the 
Sea Fisheries Service of the Ministry of Agriculture for training Indonesian 
fishermen in deep-sea fishing, and subsequently to be sold to fishing 
cooperaotives. The performance of these craft was not wholly satisfactory
largely due to the fact that the wooden hu)Js began to deteriorate after one 
or two years in the tropical, borer-laden harbor waters (17) . 
· The import of these Japanese majan� boats was followed by the establish­ment of small shipyards in East Java a'n Celebes for buildi.ng similar craft 
in Indonesia. Over three hundred 40-horsepower diesel engines were imported
from Japan and Holland in 1952-3 under the ECA-MSA-TCA program, for 
installation in the domestically-constructed craft. 
Shipyards have been established in Java at Tegal� Cheribon, and Djuana, 
near Semarang, as well as in the Celebes. The yard visited a t  Djuana was 
about as striking a n  example of economic develop��nt in action as any the 
writer has seen in Asia. There were six or·oseven ways, each with a boat 
hull nearing completion. Construction methods were crude, in some cases 
representing an interesting combination of modern mechnnization and crude 
hand�labor. Two-man hand-sawyer teams, with locally made whipsaws, cut the 
4,�r.oot teak wood strips to form ·the hull; steel rivets were forced and 
harrnnered by hand, and the brass castings for the bow were hand,..filed. At 
the same time, mechanicol drills and riveters were used in fastening the 
hull components and the bow together. About one _ohundred and fifty workers, 
16. See Java Bank Report (1952-3), p. 145. 
17. Either the huJJs had not been creosoted, or the creosoting was ineffective 
under the Indonesian conditions. The same complaint was made in several 
differe.nt fishing docks .near Semarang in Februnry 19.53. • 
--
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under Indonesian supervision, were working in the government-owned Djuana 
yard. At the time of the visit, the yard, which had been in operation about 
five· or six months, was producing at an annual rate of fifty ships. The 
supervisor of the yard indicated that the target of the Djuana yard for 1954 
was 100 ships, and for the several yards in Java a total of 400. 
Information on the economics of the ship�building program was not 
available. The writer was told, however, that there was no problem in 
selling the boats. This is not surprising in view of the fact, that govern­
ment credit is readily available to finance the salest) in wholl;} er in part. 
In any event, there is apparently a greater demaid for the I!�.clonesi:111 boats 
than there was for the origir..al Japanese ... ,made boats be0ause tha InJo::1esian 
teak is mo�e resistant to marine-borers than the softe� Japanese wood (18). 
Data concerning the economics of the individual �a,..,2ang boat were 
obtained from the Sea Fisheries Service office in Jakarta a.1.1d Semara.ng and 
are worth describing (19) . 
The boats are sold to fishing cooperatives organized by groups of 
fishermen, who agree to work together under a captain whom tl1ey select. The 
cooperatives receive partial or full loans from the Credit Office of the 
Ministry of Economic Af�airs (20) to finance the purchase of a 45-foot, 40-
horsepower diesel engine majang boat at a cost of 140,000 �s. (about· 
.$12,000). (21) 
Majang boats operate with a 16 man crew, including the captain. Their 
greater speedJ range, and seaworthiness enable them to operate in the most 
productive fishing areas, and in cli1natic conditions that keep smaller, non­
powered craft at shore. As an accout.1ting average-� the boats catch between 
750- 1000 kilogra1ns of fresh fish per day and are able to operate two-thirds 
of the year or about 240 daysc The fish is marketed at a harbor auction 
sale at an average auction price of 2 rs. per kilo. The annual income per 
boat 
,. 
is thus 36,t000 rs. (about �300,000) using the lower figure for cateh. 
Of this sUJn; acco1"'di.ng to the by-laws of tl:1a cou-µerat:tve; 40% or 144J OOO rs. 
(about �13,000) is distributed among the e�e1-r wit:h the captain re�eiving one 
and a half shares� The annual incon1e per f'isherman fig·LI.I'es out to 8,700 rs. 
(about $760) or about 25 rs. per day, which is about nine or ten times 
greater than prior to mechanization. Of the tota.1 operating income, 20% is 
18 .. At a fishing village near D,juana an Indonesian fisherman showed me a 
beached Japanese ��j�� boat in an advanced stage of deterioration. The 
fisherman said, with some pride, that this didn't happen to huJJs made 
of Indonesian teak. 
19. These data were checked with three sources, and insofar as possible 
- �ompared for co.nsistency with gross data on fleet mechanization and 
fishing output published by tl1e Bank I.�'?!!_esJ:�. (Java Bank) - cf. Report 
of the Java Bank for the Financial Year 19�-53, p. 145. 
20. Typically, these loans run from 3 to 5 years at an intere.st charge of 
8- 12% on the unpaid balance. 
21. This is apparently an unsubsidi.zed price, covering both current and 
overhead costs of construction. 
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for fuel and other operating costs, 5% for repair and maintenance, 5% for 
auction expenses, 15% for repayment of interest and principal 0£ the boat 
loan, and 15% is a contribution to the cooperative reserve fu�d. 
Treating the individual cooperative, owning one maja� boat, as an 
"enterprise," the operating statement of the enterprise would tl1us be as 
follows: 
Illustrative Annual Operating Statement of 
Majang Fishing Boat Cooperative
I II . 
(in thousands of rupiah) 
144 Wages (captain and crew) 
72 Fuel, other current costs 
18 Repair and Maintenance 
18 Auction (marketing) costs 
54 Repayment of Principal and Interest 
54 Contribution to Coop. Reserve Fund 
360 
On this basis, the original loan would be repaid in three to four years, 
depending on the size of the interest payments involved. 
Though a digression, it is also interesting to draw up an illustrative 
balance sheet for the individual cooperative, as an example of the 
potentialities which the fishing cooperatives have for accumulating capital. 
On the basis of the previous data, and assuming a rate of interest on the 
original loan of 10%, and a similar rate of depreciation on the boat after 
allowing for maintenance and repair costs, the cooperative's balance sheet 
at the end of one year's operation would be as follows: 
Illustrative Balance Sheet of Fishing Cooperative 
after One Year's Operation 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
(in thousands of rupiah) 
Fixed Property (22� 126 l00 Unpaid loan 
Reserve Fund (cashJ 54 80 Net surplus 
180 180 
III� CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The foregoing desctiptions have been presented as instances of specific 
and successful development projects of interest in themselves. As has already
been noted, there are dangers in drawing general analytical conclusions from 
an admittedly small number of special cases. Nevertheless, and with this 
22. Cost of boat (140,000 rs�) less 10% annual depreciation. 
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qualification in mind, a �ew observations might be made relating these cases 
to the more general problem, of investment opportunities in underdeveloped 
areas. 
In the first place, there are at least some specific indications that 
highly profitaoble opportunities for investing relatively small amounts of 
capital do exist in underdeveloped countrioes. Recognizing the generally 
inhibiting effect on investment of the limited extent of the domestic market, 
profitable opportunities may still be found a) through production for a strong 
export market, e. g. rice in Burma, b) through production of substitutes for 
imports (e.g. ceramics in Indonesia ) ,  and c) where consumer preferences are 
so strong (e.g •. for fish in Indonesia) , quite apart from the level of imports,
that a large unfilled current demand can be presumed to exist and prospects 
for market growth may be considered bright. Obviously, as investment and 
production opportunities of these kinds are located and exploited, the size 
of the domestic market in the aggregate will rise (23). 
Finally, it might be suggested that large, capital intensive investments 
in 11 social overhead" are not invariably necessary to enaoble new industry in 
underdeveloped countries to compete successfuJly with imports from developed 
countries. The frequently made assumption, that a high aggregate capital­
output ratio is likely to characterize the .early stages of growth in under­
developed areas, consequently needs to be reexa2ni.ned empirically in the 
light of available opportunities for directly and rapidly productive invest­
ments. 
23. This is not intended to resurrect J.  B. �ay, but simply to suggest that 
as existing mark:et opportunities are exploited, potentiRl market 
opportunities may be expected to grow with the rise in o .omestic incomes. 
